Abstract-A major limitation of some recently proposed asymmetric watermarking techniques based on linear algebra lies in the strong dependence of the watermark on the original image. The present correspondence suggests an alternative scheme that not only is secure against projection attack but also allows the insertion of arbitrary watermarking sequences.
I. INTRODUCTION
Watermarking security is raising a great deal of interest in both academia and industry (see, for instance, [1] and [2] ). The analogy with public key cryptography suggests that one consider asymmetric structures, involving a private key for embedding and a public key for detection. However, this is by no means sufficient in order to make a watermarking scheme secure: as remarked in [2, Sec. 5] , almost all available asymmetric watermarking schemes can be defeated by a standard closest point or projection attack (see Section III of this correspondence for details).
In order to protect the boundary of the detection region from unauthorized access, it has been proposed to exploit sophisticated mathematical tools such as the theory of fractals (see, for instance, [3] ). From this point of view, the approach of the recent paper [4] sounds particularly appealing, since it introduces an asymmetric watermarking scheme based just on elementary linear algebra, which is proven to be secure under projection attack. Unfortunately, in order to achieve such a property, the watermark cannot be chosen arbitrarily, but it turns out to be heavily dependent on the host image (see, in particular, statement c) of the Theorem in [4, p. 787] , which shows that the watermark is forced to be a suitable multiple of a sequence deterministically extracted from the original image). As a consequence, the proposed method is appropriate just for copyright protection, where only one key is assigned to each image, but definitely not for copy protection applications such as fingerprinting, where every recipient is identified by its own key.
In this correspondence, we propose a substantial improvement of this approach, which makes it suitable also for copy protection, allowing the insertion into any image of an arbitrary watermarking sequence. The robustness of the method against standard image degradation operators relies on the choice of the watermark space proposed in [5] for the symmetric case: therefore, we can just refer to the simulation results in [5] , as Tzeng et al. do in [4, Sec. V-B-2, p. 789]. On the other hand, the security of the method can be discussed in a purely mathematical setting exactly as in [4] (see Theorem 1 below). This makes a specific experimental analysis of no value at this stage. 
II. WATERMARKING PROCEDURE
We are going to describe a subspace asymmetric watermarking procedure. In asymmetric watermarking, the encoding and decoding algorithms as well as the detection key are known, while the embedding key is kept secret. As in [4] , let us fix an integer n 1 and a feature space X (for instance, the space corresponding to the entries in the top left corner of the discrete cosine transform) and, after a singular value decomposition analysis, decompose it into two orthogonal subspaces W of dimension 2n (the perceptually robust component) and V (the component more susceptible to standard modifications of the image).
Next, we split W into two orthogonal subspaces G and H of dimension n and we choose matrices G and H whose columns form an orthonormal basis of G and H, respectively. Finally, we pick an arbitrary watermarking sequence w 2 n .
A. Embedding and Detection
Let o 2 X be the feature vector associated to the original image.
We write
where o 2 W and o 2 V, and o = Gs + Ht:
The watermark embedding is defined by
where G is the embedding key. Due to the properties of the subspace W, the watermark turns out to be robust against standard image degradations.
Next we choose a symmetric matrix A (i.e., A T = A) satisfying A(s + w) = s + w (4) and an orthogonal matrix B (i.e., B T = B 01 ) satisfying Bt = (s + w) (5) with := ktk=ks + wk, and we define
which is released to the public and is the crucial ingredient in the detection phase. The matrix A, whose existence is ensured by the trivial choice A = I (the identity matrix), introduces a further degree of freedom which can be exploited to minimize false-positive probability.
As far as B is concerned, we point out the following easy fact. Notice that the assumption s + w 6 = 0 is trivially satisfied since imperceptibility of the watermark implies kwk ksk. 
Definitions (7) and (8) for the detector are motivated by the following result, which shows that the watermark is perfectly detected in the feature vector associated to the watermarked image. Notice that, in order to work, the detector needs only the matrix D and the vector s+w. Therefore, if we take (G; H; A; B) as a secret key and (D; s+w) as a public key, we obtain an asymmetric watermarking scheme as in [4] .
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Security of the watermark refers to the inability by nonauthorized users to decode the embedded sequence. As discussed in [2, Sec. 5], the crucial problem for asymmetric watermarking security is represented by the projection attack. As explained in [ We emphasize that the corresponding result in [4] implies that w is a multiple of s (see statement c) of the Theorem on [4, p. 787] ). On the contrary, the security of our scheme does not depend on a specific watermark, thus making it suitable also for copy protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have presented an asymmetric watermarking scheme that improves a recent proposal [4] by allowing the insertion into the host image of an arbitrary, image independent, sequence of data. In particular, it has been checked that the method is robust against the most dangerous attack for asymmetric schemes, namely, the projection attack.
Future work will deal with related implementation issues and a full experimental assessment in a simulation environment. Further investigation will concern the optimal choice of matrix A with respect to detection performances.
